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More Social Capital, Less Erosion: Evidence from Peru= ===s Altiplano
Abstract
The debate over sustainable intensification has hinged on private incentives to abate land
degradation.  Largely missing is the role of social capital in both creating incentives and
removing barriers to soil conservation.  Yet soil conservation embodies the externality problem
that bedevils so many aspects of natural resource management.  Action by one farmer to reduce
water or wind erosion may benefit neighboring fields by slowing the rate of water or wind
movement across those lands.  Yet these benefits are not fully captured by the farmer making the
conservation investment.  However, when economic agents care for one another, these
externalities can be internalized, reducing the individual’s disincentive to perform a socially level
of natural resource conservation.  Likewise, community organizations may provide collective
capital and labor to overcome adoption barriers faced by individuals.
The twin hypotheses that 1) farming practices influence soil erosion and 2) social capital
influences the adoption of sustainable farming practices are tested with data from a 1999 survey
of 197 farms in the Peruvian Altiplano around Lake Titicaca.  The survey used cluster sampling
of farms in villages to represent each of three arable agro-ecological zones in the Ilave-Huenque
river basin.  Relative asset levels were used to stratify resident households within villages. 
Personal interviews collected a wide range of data on farm household assets, management
practices, and status of agricultural natural resources.2
In the first stage of econometric analysis, the erosion causal model was tested using two
dependent variables, the perceived changes over 20 years in soil depth and relative crop yield,
respectively.  Explanatory variables included physical factors (topography, agro-ecological zone,
soil texture) as well as farming practices (orientation of tillage relative to slope, length of fallow
period in crop rotation).  Both the ordered probit soil depth change model and the tobit relative
crop yield change model found longer fallows and vertical furrows to reduce soil erosion.   These
results were robust to Hausman tests of endogeneity.
In the second-stage analysis, two random effects generalized least squares regression
models were run to identify determinants of these sustainable cropping practices from a range of
candidate explanatory variables including price of potato (the dominant cash crop), physical
factors, and farm assets (including land, equipment, buildings, labor force, human capital and
social capital).  Social capital variables included village land area managed in Aaynoca@ (a
traditional collective crop rotation arrangement) and household members participating in
community organizations.  Results found crop price insignificant and most farm physical and
financial assets to vary in effect between models.  However, the social capital variables tended to
be both significant and positive in favoring the adoption of both soil-conserving farming
practices.
This evidence of local association links to sustainable natural resource management is
encouraging for a setting where the track record of sustainable intensification via government or
market channels is poor.  The results merit verification research and examination of ways to
strengthen promising local institutions.3
Introduction
Steep slopes make mountain regions especially susceptible to soil erosion the world over.
The mountainous regions of Latin America are no exception, and rising rural populations have
created serious soil erosion problems in many parts of the region (García Barrios and García
Barrios, 1990; Reinoso and Valdivia, 1994; Zimmerer, 1993). 
The challenge of investing in soil conservation has been framed in the larger debate over
sustainable intensification.  Some authors argue that poor farmers have no choice but to put
immediate food security ahead of long-term sustainability (Figueroa, 1998).  Trapped in a
downward spiral of declining productivity, a rescue from outside seems the only viable policy
prescription.  But as market solutions have displaced government-sponsored remedies to rural
development problems, the ideas of Esther Boserup (1965) have gained notoriety.   The Boserup
school counters that rising land values (triggered by rising populations) motivate even poor
farmers to invest in soil conservation (Boserup, 1965; Tiffen et al., 1994).  From this perspective,
declining productivity is endogenously self-correcting.  Population growth may undermine
agricultural productivity in the medium term, but in the long term productivity is a U-shaped
function of population density (Templeton and Scherr, 1999).  With growing demand for food,
prices will rise, land values will follow, and conservation investments will occur (Tiffen et al.,
1994).   A middle ground between these schools contends that population growth can trigger
unsustainable, immiserizing intensification based solely on increased labor input; by contrast,
capital-led intensification tends to conserve soil and enhance fertility (Clay et al., 1998).4
Rising population is axiomatic to the sustainable intensification arguments, notably in
Africa (Boserup, 1965; Clay et al., 1998; Templeton and Scherr, 1999; Tiffen et al., 1994).  But
in recent years, rising population has been the exception, not the rule, in the central Andes of
South America.  Outmigration from the central Andes has been flowing toward the Pacific coast
and the Amazon jungle for over two decades (Collins, 1988; Wiegers et al., 1999).  At the state
(or department) level in southern Peru, rural-urban migration has increased (Caballero, 1992). 
The migratory flows have been accelerated by rural terrorism in Peru during the 1980’s and early
1990’s and by the precipitous decline in government-financed agricultural research and outreach
to peasant farmers during the same period throughout the central and southern Andean region. 
Peasant agriculture in areas like the Andean Altiplano between Peru and Bolivia seems
trapped at the bottom of the U-curve.  Geographically remote from major markets and suffering a
continual outmigration of the most productive aged residents, the region has defied generations
of rural development projects.  People publicly question how the region’s agriculture could seem
to be less productive today than under the Inca empire, five hundred years ago.
Absent the market opportunities created by growing populations and absent public
investment in peasant agriculture and natural resource management, what hope is there to induce
peasant farmers to abate soil erosion and related threats to natural resource sustainability in
fragile mountain landscapes?
The debate over intensification has hinged on private incentives to abate land
degradation.  Largely missing from the debate is the role of social capital in both creating
incentives and removing barriers to soil conservation.  Economic definitions of social capital5
center on its ability to internalize economic externalities (Collier, 1998).  However, the scale at
which this occurs varies from one definition to another (Woolcock, 1998).  At one extreme is a
narrow focus on Putnam’s local “networks of civic engagement” (Putnam et al., 1993, as cited in
Grootaert, 1997).  At the other extreme is the encompassing “social and political environment
that enables norms to develop and shapes social structure” (Grootaert, 1997, p. 3).  For our
purposes, the essential characteristic is the shared notion that the relationships facilitated by
social capital engender an increase in the economic efficiency at the community level.
The potential of social capital to internalize economic externalities is of particular interest
in natural resource management.  Agricultural natural resource management is notoriously prone
to engender externalities in land (soil erosion), water (runoff and leaching) and air (spray drift,
wind erosion) (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987).  Soil erosion by water or wind poses twin threats
to productivity: the obvious internal threat is a reduction in the longterm productivity of the land,
while the external threat occurs via the spread of eroded gullies to neighboring land, siltation of
waterways, and air pollution by airborne soil.  Likewise, some benefits of soil conservation are
realized off the farm.  Action by one farmer to reduce water or wind erosion may benefit
neighboring fields by slowing the rate of water or wind movement across those lands.  Although
these benefits are not captured by the farmer investing in conservation, community organizations
can internalize these externalities.  Social capital in the form of shared norms and/or fellow
feeling among community members has the potential to motivate individuals to act for the
collective good.  Where community organizations exist, social capital may further help
individuals overcome resource barriers to conservation, by providing collective capital and labor.6
The objective of this paper is to examine whether social capital holds promise for
inducing sustainable land management under conditions where population growth is unlikely to
trigger sustainable intensification.  The paper first develops a conceptual behavioral model for
natural resource management with externalities in order to characterize the effect of social capital
on conservation investment.  It proceeds with an empirical analysis of data from a 1999 cross-
sectional farm survey in an erosion-prone river basin south of Lake Titicaca in Peru.  The first
stage analysis seeks to identify sustainable farming practices associated with reduced erosion. 
The second stage analysis then tests empirically whether social capital variables are important in
determining the choice of sustainable farming practices.
Conceptual model
Consider an economic agent who cares about some other agent.  A simple example would
be an agent i whose utility function includes his own net income (ππππ i) plus a positively weighted
multiple (δδδδ  ∈  (0,1]) of the net income of another member (ππππ j) of his community.  Members of the
community engage in producing a farm product, y(x,k,ci,cj), whose production process can be
characterized as a concave, increasing function separable in variable inputs x, capital inputs k,
and conservation practices c.  Conservation practices have the special attribute that conservation
by agent i, ci, also enters the production function of agent j, and vice-versa.  This might be the
case where soil conservation in one farmer’s field prevents gullying that would spread into the
neighboring field, hastening soil and yield loss there.  The optimization problem of agent i can be
formulated as follows:7
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Since the second term in Equation (2) is greater than zero by assumption, the optimal level of ci
must exceed the level that would satisfy the equation in the absence of the second term.  Put
intuitively, a farmer who cares about his neighbor and knows that his own conservation practices
will benefit both himself and his neighbor will optimally choose to do at least as much
conservation as he would if he ignored his neighbor.
Data and empirical methods
The key empirical question then becomes whether agents care about one another enough
to engage in charitable conservation behavior.  One way to test this hypothesis is to include
empirical indicators of social capital as explanatory variables.  A wide range of variables has
been used in prior studies as indicators of social capital (Grootaert, 1997).  In a village-level
study such as this one, appropriate variables are measures of association membership and
involvement, as well as the existence of institutions of collective action.8
The null hypothesis that social capital variables have no effect on the choice of farming
practice was tested with farm survey data from the Peruvian Altiplano (Ahigh plain@) around Lake
Titicaca.  The 1999 survey covered 265 farms in the Ilave-Huenque river basin in southern Puno
department.  The analysis presented here is based on data from the 197 farms located in the three
agro-ecological zones where crop production was common.  These zones ranged in altitude from
3,800 to 4,000 meters above sea level.  Due to altitude and weather patterns, agriculture in the
area is subject to risks of frost, drought, and floods.  The Aymara-speaking inhabitants practice
potato-based cropping systems that typically include quinoa and cereals (barley, oats and/or
broad bean).  Livestock, notably cattle, sheep and alpacas are key elements of local farming
systems.  Due to a history of hereditary field subdivisions (Caballero, 1992), farm fields are
fragmented and small; farms average about one hectare of cropped area (Swinton et al., 1999). 
According to the 1992 census, district-level poverty in the study area ranged from 63 to 95
percent (INEI, 1994)
The survey used cluster sampling of farm households in 2-3 villages per zone to represent
the three agro-ecological zone strata.  Relative asset levels as subjectively assessed by village
leaders were used to stratify resident households within villages as poor, average or less poor. 
Personal interview conducted in April-June, 1999 collected a wide range of data on farm
household assets, management practices during the 1998-99 agricultural season, and the status of
agricultural natural resources.9
Following Putnam et al. (1993) and Grootaert (1997), the survey measured indicators of
social capital at the local level of horizontal associations.  Specifically, it measured a) the number
of associations in which household members participated, b) whether or not the household head
had held a position in local government during the past ten years, c) the village land area under
the collectively planned but privately managed aynoca system, and d) the number of village
families using communal grazing land.  The first two measures are at the household level; the
last two are at the village level.
The first stage of the econometric analysis aimed to test the hypothesis that certain
farming practices reduce soil erosion.  The erosion causal model was tested using two dependent
variables.  The first variable was the perceived change over 20 years in soil depth (measured as a
Likert scale where 1=major increase in soil depth and 5=major decrease in soil depth).  The
second variable was the perceived relative crop yield decline in a typical recent year as compared
to a typical year twenty years ago.  This variable was only measured for the 89 percent of
respondents who perceived a yield reduction over that period of time. Explanatory variables
included physical factors (topography, agro-ecological zone, soil texture) as well as farming
practices (orientation of tillage relative to slope, proportion of crop rotation time devoted to
fallow).
The soil depth model was estimated as an ordered probit, while the relative yield
regression was estimated as a tobit, both using Stata 6.0 (StataCorp, 1999).  In order to correct
for cluster effects, dummy variables were included for all villages and their contribution formally
tested using Wald test.  After identifying preferred models, key variables were instrumented and10
subjected to Hausman specification tests of endogeneity (Greene, 1993, p. 479).  These were
conducted by estimating predicted values for the key variable in question and then comparing the
less efficient but unbiased model using predicted values of the key determinant variable with the
more efficient but possibly biased model with the key variable itself.
The second stage analysis sought to identify the determinants of those erosion-reducing
practices identified in the first stage regressions.  Since the presence of other village-level
variables made village dummies infeasible in these regressions, random effects generalized least
squares (GLS) models were run (StataCorp, 1999).  The degree of correlation between village
clusters and individual households is captured by the correlation coefficient, rho, which is
reported with the regression results.  The explanatory variables in the choice of farming practice
models included the price of potato (the dominant cash crop), physical factors, and farm assets
(including land, equipment, buildings, labor force, human capital and social capital).
Results
1. Erosion determinants
Both the ordered probit model of change in perceived soil loss and the tobit model of
relative decline in perceived crop yield generated highly significant regression results, based on
chi-square statistics (Table 1).  After controlling for other conditioning factors, the two practices
that contribute significantly to reduced soil erosion are longer fallows and use of vertical furrows.
 Vertical furrows entered the soil loss ordered probit model as a quadratic term; both the linear
and the quadratic variables had significant coefficient estimates indicating that vertical furrows11
reduce soil loss at a decreasing rate up to the point where 78% of fields had vertical furrows
(Swinton and Quiroz, 2000). 
With one exception, the Hausman tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that the original
survey variables (proportion of rotation in fallow and proportion of fields with vertical furrows)
were exogenous.  The one exception was the case of vertical furrows in the perceived soil loss
probit model (chi-square p-value = 0.018).   For this case, the results from the perceived soil loss
ordered probit with the instrumented vertical furrows variable are also presented in Table 1. 
Although coefficient magnitudes differ, the signs and significance levels of the coefficient
estimates are identical to those in the original ordered probit.
It should be noted that the regression results are only partially consistent with prevailing
scientific thinking about determinants of soil loss.  That fallow can reduce soil loss fits with its
effect of reducing soil disturbance.  The beneficial effect of fallow is supported by prior research
in the Altiplano (Bernet, 1995).  But that vertical furrows reduce soil loss contradicts common
wisdom about the effects of tillage orientation on the speed of runoff and associated erosion
(Morgan, 1996).  This result, which was statistically robust for the perceived soil loss model but
not for perceived yield loss, merits further inquiry.
2. Social capital and the determinants of sustainable practices choices
Based on the first-round findings that fallow and vertical furrows were associated with
reduced erosion, the second round analysis sought to identify the factors determining choice of
these specific cropping practices.  Both random effects GLS regressions were highly significant,12
as shown in Table 2. Neither model had a rho-value different from zero, suggesting no village
cluster effect on variance.  
The results were as notable for what they did not find as for what they did.  Crop price
proved insignificant, and most farm assets were consistent with expectations but not consistently
significant across regressions.  The fallow area model indicated that the fallow proportion of crop
rotations is greater in certain agro-ecological zones, in villages with a prior natural resource
development project and/or more land in aynoca management.  Fallow is also more widespread
on farms with well equipment, less off-farm income, more secondary school-educated adults, and
more association memberships.  The vertical furrows model indicated that the proportion of
fields with vertical furrows is higher on farms where poverty (unmet basic needs) is less, home
equipment (radios, looms, etc.) is less, association memberships are more common, and more
fields are located at footslope.
The social capital coefficient estimates stand out.  The number of household members
participating in local associations was the sole significant variable common to both regressions. 
Like the highly significant aynoca land area coefficient in the fallow model, association
memberships were positively associated with the adoption of both soil-conserving farming
practices. 
Hausman tests of endogeneity were again attempted on these social capital variables in
order to verify the direction of causality (and rule out the possibility that, for example,
households with more fallow therefore had more time to spend in associations).  For village land
area in aynocas, no suitable instrumental variables could be identified.  In the instance of13
association memberships, instrumental variables were identified, but the Hausman test was
insignificant.
Conclusions
In the case described here, social capital appears to contribute meaningfully to the use of
cropping practices that conserve soil.  These findings have two limitations.  First, one of the
“sustainable” farming practices (vertical furrows) is not normally associated with reduced soil
erosion.  Second, measurement is difficult – both for social capital and for soil erosion in a
single-visit interview.   With those caveats, the statistical results are encouraging.
That social capital at the village level may contribute to long term viability is especially
encouraging in the specific context of the Altiplano.  This is a setting where mountainous terrain
limits potential agricultural productivity and access to markets.  Compounding these natural
limitations, public investment in agricultural research and outreach for mountain smallholders
has been severely curtailed over the past 15 years.  With government funds in short supply and
markets too remote to induce endogenous intensification, alternatives to public programs and
market solutions are needed. 
The evidence presented here suggests that even where money is scarce, marginal gains to
natural resource sustainability may be had from local efforts linked to participation in local,
horizontal associations.  The associations that mattered among these villages in the Peruvian
Altiplano range from mothers’ clubs to irrigation committees.  Of special interest is the
traditional local institution of the aynoca.  The aynoca is a land management system whereby14
designated land areas are to be planted to the same crop each year.  Aynoca areas are composed
of many individually owned fields, but the owners have a longstanding understanding that if they
plant the agreed crop, then members will take turns watching over it to protect against marauding
wildlife and thieves.  Aynocas typically follow an established crop rotation.  Since this includes
one or more years in fallow, landholding in the aynoca tend to ensure that fallow remains part of
the crop rotation.  Indeed, some of the farmers interviewed blamed yield declines on the fact that
they had withdrawn from an aynoca or the village had decided to eliminate the practice of
aynocas.
The evidence here for natural resource benefits from local horizontal associations is not
strong enough to compel policy prescriptions.  But it is enough to call for more research to
replicate these results.  If local institutions can enforce norms that benefit the community, then
strengthening (and perhaps extending) such institutions could constitute a low-cost means of
contributing modestly to natural resource sustainability.  Formal research is in its infancy on how
the social capital embodied in local institutions can be strengthened.  But the evolving body of
knowledge suggests that opening opportunities for democratic participation encourages the
establishment of new associations, and introducing linkages from the local to the regional scale
allows local institutions to extend their reach (Bebbington, 1999; Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996;
Ostrom et al., 1993).
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Table 1: Soil loss and 20-year yield loss regression results, cropped zones of Ilave-Huenque basin,
Puno, Peru, 1999






Unit of measure Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Zone: Suni A Binary 1.784 4.67 *** 1.893 3.52 *** -0.034 -0.68
Zone: Suni B Binary 1.247 2.74 *** 1.809 2.64 *** 0.021 0.35
Fallow fields Proportion of fields -1.453 -1.90 * -2.770 -2.34 ** -0.339 -3.23 ***
Small grains Prop’n of planted area -0.495 -0.96 -0.743 -0.96 0.076 1.07
Footslope Proportion of fields 0.357 0.61 0.810 0.98 -0.370 -1.83 *
Sq. footslope Proportion of fields 0.579 1.84 *
Slope Proportion of fields 0.835 1.13 1.911 1.51 0.148 1.51
Sandy soil Proportion of fields -0.185 -0.51 0.477 0.89 0.117 2.34 **
Vertical furrows Proportion of fields -1.823 -2.15 ** -17.415 -2.80 *** -0.059 -1.29
Sq. vertical furrows Proportion of fields 1.170 1.82 * 14.173 3.22 ***
Contour furrows Proportion of fields -0.546 -0.65 0.529 0.51 0.105 0.86
Fertilizer Kg/ha -0.002 -1.78 * -0.002 -1.87 * 0.000 -0.23
Pesticides Kg/ha -0.030 -0.98 -0.041 -0.96 -0.009 -2.09 **
Sq. Pesticides Kg/ha 0.001 1.33 0.001 1.10 0.000 1.97 *
Labor value New soles 0.000 -0.62 0.000 -0.88 0.000 -2.34 **
Sq. labor value New soles 0.000 1.95 *
Constant 0.464 7.58 ***
Regression diagnostics:
Observations (n) 173 124 172
Chi2 46.56 56.88 48.50
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Asterisks denote coefficient significance at 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***) levels.19
Table 2: Determinants of cropping practices that reduce erosion: Random effects regression results,
cropped zones of Ilave-Huenque basin, Puno, Peru, 1999.
Variable Unit of measure Fallow Vertical Furrows
Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat.
Price of potato Peru soles/kg # -0.029 -0.29 -0.122 -0.51
Unmet basic needs Sum 0.027 1.42 -0.087 -1.91 *
Cropped area hectares 0.012 0.89 0.016 0.49
Pasture area hectares 0.000 1.18 0.001 0.73
Vehicles owned Units 0.008 0.48 0.000 0.01
Store/warehouse Units 0.030 1.37 -0.027 -0.53
Well equipment Units 0.079 2.81 *** 0.008 0.12
Other ag. equipment Units 0.001 0.09 -0.001 -0.04
Home equipment Units 0.007 1.04 -0.027 -1.65 *
Total SEVU's Sheep value units 0.000 -0.42 0.000 0.49
Family agric. labor available Person-years -0.015 -1.60 0.002 0.09
Credit Peru soles 0.000 -0.59 0.000 0.90
Nonfarm income Peru soles .000007 -2.28 ** 0.000 -1.31
Distance to paved road Minutes on foot 0.119 1.04 -0.097 -0.36
Education of HH head Years -0.007 -0.83 0.004 0.22
Adults with high school Units 0.030 2.20 ** -0.032 -0.99
Position of HH head Binary -0.004 -0.15 -0.053 -0.94
Association memberships Units 0.027 2.07 ** 0.069 2.23 **
Aynoca area hectares 0.001 2.65 *** 0.001 0.80
Families using communal pastures -0.001 -1.18 -0.002 -1.12
Suni A zone Binary 0.188 3.85 *** 0.055 0.48
Suni B zone Binary 0.364 5.42 *** -0.173 -1.10
Footslope Proportion of fields -0.004 -0.06 0.265 1.79 *
Slope Proportion of fields -0.082 -1.13 0.028 0.16
Sandy soil Proportion of fields 0.025 0.63 0.061 0.67
Fertilizer Kg/ha 0.000 -0.97 0.000 -0.28
Pesticides Kg/ha -0.001 -0.75 0.001 0.27
Natural Resource project Binary 0.161 2.34 ** 0.161 0.99
Constant -0.227 -1.76 0.724 2.38 **
Regression diagnostics:
Nbr. of observations 178 179




Note: SEVU=sheep-equivalent value unit.
Note: Asterisks denote coefficient significance at 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***) levels.
# During 1998-99, the exchange rate of Peru’s nuevo sol was approximately US$1 = S/. 3.20.